Delimitation is the process of fixing or redrawing the boundaries of territorial constituencies for elections to representative legislative bodies. In a federal and highly populous democracy such as India, delimitation has profound consequences for political representation, electoral equality, federal balance, social justice and democratic legitimacy. India, however, has adopted a distinctive approach to delimitation. Although the Constitution originally contemplated periodic readjustment, the allocation of seats among States was frozen on the basis of the 1971 Census in order to encourage population stabilisation. The 84th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2001 extended this freeze until the first census after 2026, while the 87th Amendment Act, 2003 permitted readjustment of constituency boundaries using 2001 Census figures without altering the overall allocation of seats among States. The Delimitation Commission constituted under the Delimitation Act, 2002 subsequently carried out the principal nationwide delimitation exercise, culminating in the 2008 orders. In India, this exercise is constitutionally mandated under Articles 81 and 82, yet it has been frozen since 1976 through constitutional amendments that postponed readjustment of seat allocation until after the first census taken after 2026. The 2026 Delimitation Bill, introduced alongside the Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill, sought to operationalise this deferred exercise by expanding the Lok Sabha from 543 to 850 seats and redrawing constituencies on the basis of the 2011 Census. Both Bills were defeated in Parliament, with the constitutional amendment falling short of the required two-thirds majority. This paper examines India's constitutional and legal framework for delimitation, analyses the 2026 legislative proposals and their failure, and undertakes a comparative analysis of delimitation regimes in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and South Africa. It further examines contemporary Indian case law on judicial review of delimitation, including the Supreme Court's 2024 decision in Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod v. Union of India and the 2025 ruling in K. Purushottam Reddy. The paper argues that while Article 329(a) imposes a near-absolute bar on judicial scrutiny of delimitation orders, recent jurisprudence has cautiously reopened avenues for review in cases of manifest arbitrariness or constitutional incompatibility. Comparative practice demonstrates that independent boundary commissions, transparent criteria, and limited judicial oversight are essential safeguards against gerrymandering and electoral manipulation. The paper concludes that India's failure to enact the 2026 Delimitation Bill represents both a constitutional crisis and an opportunity for principled reform.